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I. INTRODUCTION

"Big hairy woman you need to shave that stuff[,] Big hairy woman
you know I bet it's tough... ."' These are lyrics from the rap music
group 2 Live Crew's alleged parody of Roy Orbison's classic rock ballad,
Oh, Pretty Woman.' The copyright holders of Orbison's song claimed that
2 Live Crew's alleged parody infringed the copyright of Orbison's original
song, and 2 Live Crew defended the copyright action by claiming that the
parody was a fair use.3
" 'Only one thing is impossible to God, to find any sense in any copyright law on this planet.' "' By this, Mark Twain was not specifically
referring to the tension between copyright law's fair-use doctrine and
parodies, 5 but his statement accurately reflects practitioners' frustrations in
dealing with the courts' inconsistent treatment in this area of law. Despite
the recent Supreme Court decision which expressly considered for the first
time whether a parody could be a fair use,' neither legal practitioners nor
parodists have any clear guidance to anticipate whether a commercial

1. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1179 (1994) (quoting 2 LIVE CREW,
Pretty Woman, on AS CLEAN As THEY WANNA BE (Luke Records 1989). In 1989, Luther Campbell,
the lead singer of the rap music group 2 Live Crew, wrote this parody of Roy Orbison's rock ballad
and included it on 2 Live Crew's album. Id. at 1168.
2. Id. Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote the classic rock ballad, Oh, Pretty Woman in 1964,
and, thereafter, they assigned their rights in the song to Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. Id.
3. Id.
4. Robert J. Kapelke, Comment, Piracy or Parody: Never the Twain, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 550,
550 (1966) (quoting MARK TWAIN'S NOTEBOOK 381 (Albert B. Paine ed., 1972)).
5. Id. at 550 (stating that Mark Twain was probably referring only to the statutory law of copyright).
6. The United States Supreme Court once before considered whether parody may be fair use,
but issued no opinion due to the equal division of the Court. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 (citing
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), affg Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d
532 (9th Cir. 1956)).
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parody of a copyrighted work will be a fair use or an infringement of the
original artist's copyright.

Simply stated, the creator of an original work7 is entitled to copyright
protection for that work.' Copyright protection entitles the copyright owner to certain rights,9 including the exclusive right to prepare, or to authorize the preparation of, derivative works' based on the copyrighted

7. "A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time; where a
work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time
constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has been prepared in different versions, each
version constitutes a separate work." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). To qualify for copyright protection, the creator's
original work must be "fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression." Id. Section 102, which defines, in
general, the subject matter of copyright, reads as follows:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work.
Id.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This section provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
Id.
10. "A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative work.' " 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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work." Thus, if another artist 2 wishes to adapt or to transform a preexisting copyrighted work into a new creation, the artist must first seek a license from the copyright owner of the original work. 3
Seemingly then, if the copyright owner declines to issue a license, the
artist must either forego adaptation of the preexisting work, or proceed at
the risk of a copyright infringement action. However, under certain circumstances, the artist's secondary use of the preexisting copyrighted work
may be deemed fair, and thus adjudged an excusable copyright infringement.' 4 The fair-use doctrine 5 permits an artist to use a preexisting
copyrighted work for (un)certain purposes in (un)certain circumstances. 6
One such circumstance may be in the creation of parodies. Because a
parody achieves its effects by commenting on or criticizing a work that is
already known to a particular audience, a parodist often must copy or
mirror portions of the original work in order to reveal to the audience the
existence of the original. 7 If the parodist's use of copyrighted material
spurs the copyright owner to commence an infringement action, the parodist is likely to claim fair use.
The fair-use doctrine acts as a sort of "life-support system" for parodies using copyrighted material without license.'" However, because the
fair-use doctrine is so flexible, 9 parodies live or die according to the par11. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
12. For the purposes of this Note, the term "artist" may be used interchangeably with "writer" or
"creator."
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (codifying the fair-use doctrine).
15. Id.
16. Id. Section 107 gives a nonexclusive list of certain purposes that might be considered fair
under the appropriate circumstances, and then gives a nonexclusive list of factors to consider in determining whether the circumstances are, indeed, appropriate for a finding of fair use. See id.
17. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
18. A finding of copyright infringement can result in a permanent injunction of the parody, 17
U.S.C. § 502 (1988), or criminal penalties and forfeiture of all existing copies of the parody. 17 U.S.C.
§ 506 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). However, in its first consideration of parody in the fair-use context, see
infra note 57 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994), stated:
Because the fair use enquiry often requires close questions of judgment as to the extent of
permissible borrowing in cases involving parodies (or other critical works), courts may also
wish to bear in mind that the goals of the copyright law, "to stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter," are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive
relief when parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of fair use ....
[There are
cases] "raising reasonable contentions of fair use" where "there may be a strong public
interest in the publication of the secondary work [and] the copyright owner's interest may
be adequately protected by an award of damages for whatever infringement is found."
Id. at 1171 n.10 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1132, 1134 (1990)).
19. "Fair use" is not defined by statute. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (giving no
definition of fair use, but only factors with which to determine a fair use). Fair use is to be determined
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ticular judge's discretionary impulses during trial." Due to the practically
unfettered discretion that the current fair-use framework permits,2' judges
inappropriately are permitted and, in fact, required to critique the artistic
meaning of the particular parody in order to determine whether it merits
fair-use protection.'
This Note examines the treatment of parodies under the fair-use defense to copyright infringement. The Note focuses on the ease with which
judges may use the flexible fair-use framework to censor parodies. Part II
considers the history and purpose of the parodic art form. Part I addresses the goals underlying copyright law and the limitations on copyright
protection. Part IH also examines the history and flexibility of one specific
aspect of the copyright law-the fair-use doctrine.
Part IV of this Note discusses the application of the fair-use doctrine
to parodies and suggests that courts, under the guise of implementing the
fair-use doctrine, impermissibly have censored parodies that are sexually
explicit or distasteful. Part IV also analyzes the Supreme Court's recent
decision that considered whether a parody could be a fair use and contends that the framework mandated by the Court for analyzing parodies is
not only unworkable, but also will make it easier for courts to censor
parodies. Part V argues that the courts' treatment of parodies under the
fair-use defense has deviated from the goals of copyright law, and considers two alternative frameworks under which parodies may be analyzed.
I.

PARODY-HISTORY AND PURPOSE

Parody, one of the oldest forms of literary expression,' is a type of
satire which achieves its effects by mimicking and rendering ludicrous
by considering the purpose of a work and several other factors, some of which are listed in Title 17 of
the United States Code. Id. As one judge described it, "[t]he [fair use] doctrine is entirely equitable
and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition." Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp.
130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 note (1988) (stating fair use is an equitable doctrine with no generally
applicable definition and so the issue turns on questions of fact).
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22. Such judicial discretion may be appropriate in other fair-use contexts, such as when determining whether "time shifting" through the use of Betamax recorders is a fair use, see Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984), but it is wholly inappropriate for judges to
be placed in a position permitting them to determine which particular parodies are artistically significant enough to warrant protection.
23. Charles C. Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech-The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine by

First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 39, 40-42 (1980). Noteworthy ancient parodies
include the following: Aristophanes' play The Frogs, Chaucer's The Rhyme of Sir Thopas and The
Nun's Priest's Tale; Cervantes' Don Quixote; Pope's The Rape of the Lock, and Swift's Gulliver's

Travels. Id. at 40 & n.4, 41 & n.6. See generally R. ARMoUR, THE CLASsics RECLASSFID (1960)
(providing a concise history of parody); Leon R. Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of
Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REv. 1130 (1955) (same).
24. See Yankwich, supra note 23, at 1131 (stating that parody is a criticism by ridicule of a
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the style or thoughts of an original. 5 By definition, a parody's existence
is dependent on the preexistence of the work that the parody intends to
mock.26 Therefore, parody has accurately been called a "parasitic art. ' '27
Despite this negative connotation, however, the parody is a highly
revered and very popular art form.28 Among the most notable literary
parodists are Shakespeare, Hemingway, and Faulkner." Musical parodists
have included Mozart, Gilbert and Sullivan, and Allan Sherman." In describing the important role parody performs, one authority commented:
[A]lthough a parasitic art and written at times with malice, parody
is as fundamental to literature as is laughter to health .... The
best parody surpasses mere imitation. It stands on its own feet,
containing enough independent humor to be funny beyond aping
of the original....

person or work). Literary scholars distinguish parody from the related satirical arts of burlesque and
travesty. Note, The Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement: Productive FairUse After Betamax, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1395, 1395 n.1 (1984). "Parody" is closely modeled on the original, yet produces a
ridiculous effect. 11 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 247 (2d ed. 1989). "Burlesque" is more of a
broad caricature of the spirit or manner of a serious work. See Yankwich, supra note 23, at 1130-31.
' Travesty" ridicules stately characters by placing them in ordinary settings. Note, supra, at 1395. Critics consider parody the most noble of these art forms because it achieves its critical and humorous
effects by calling attention to the flaws in the original. Id.
25. Note, supra note 24, at 1395. According to Nimmer, a well-respected copyright scholar, the
parodist's imitation can take two forms. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A], at 13-30 to -31 (1994). First, the parody can appropriate the actual words of a
text or lyrics. See id. § 13.03[A], at 13-51. Second, the parody can appropriate the general structure or
expression of the original. See id. § 13.03[A], at 13-31.
26. Note, supra note 24, at 1395 n.4 (quoting 1 WALTER HAMILTON, PARODIES OF THE WORKS
OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN AUTHORS 1 (1884) (Walter Hamilton ed., Johnson Reprint Corporation,
1967)). There is a debate as to the definition of parody for legal analysis. Some have argued that a
legal parody must target its criticism at the host work, see, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180,
185 (2d Cir. 1981), while others have contended that a parody may use the host work to criticize
society or something other than the host work and still be a legally protectible parody. See, e.g., id. at
185-89 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). It is worthy of note that Black's Law Dictionary does not define
parody. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1116 (6th ed. 1990). However, for a general working definition, parody may be defined as "an imitation of a work more or less closely modelled on the original,
but so turned as to produce a ridiculous effect." 11 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 247 (2d ed.
1989). It is my contention that, for purposes of a fair-use analysis, the definition of parody should not
be limited to those works that target its criticism or humor at the host work. Rather, in accordance
with the Oxford English Dictionary, a parody should be construed as a work that, while modeled on
the original, merely produces some ridiculous effect but does not necessarily comment upon the host
work. See id.
27. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETICS 600 (1965).
28. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
29. See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1987); PARODIES: AN
ANTHOLOGY FROM CHAUCER TO BEERBOHM-AND AFTER 14-18, 560-61 (Dwight Macdonald ed.,

1960).
30. Steven R. Gordan & Charles J. Sanders, Stranger in Parodies:Law of Musical Satire, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 18, 1991, at 5.
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There are as many different motives for parody as there are
parodists. Sometimes ... it was personal spite. More often the
parodist employed the style of his original to poke fun at current
follies or vices. [The parodist] might have a social axe to grind or
he might wish to expose a certain literary school or mannerism
which has hardened into conventionality.... With a history of
twenty-five centuries behind it, parody, it seems, is here to stay.
Like all literature it has had its ups and downs, but at its best it is
more than a parasitic art. It has attracted men and women of major
stature and at times has shown the capacity to outlive the serious
work which has inspired it."
By exposing the weaknesses or flaws in artists' creations or by commenting on society, parody not only entertains, but also criticizes.32 Such
criticism promotes the development of society's stockpile of art.33 In criticizing, however, a parody often must use extensive portions of the original work. 4 If the parodist makes extensive use of an original's copyrighted expression, then the parody may clash with copyright law." When
such a clash occurs, the fate of the parody is determined by a precarious
balancing between the rights of the parodist and the copyright privileges
granted to the creator of the original work. 6 However, a close examination of copyright law's justifications and limitations reveals that, in general, the parodist's claims should outweigh those of the creator of the original work.
III. COPYRIGHT LAW

A. History and Purpose of Copyright Protection
Article I of the Constitution empowers Congress to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
' Pursuant to this
Authors... the exclusive Right to their... Writings."37
constitutional grant of power, Congress has enacted laws since 1790 that
have provided authors some protection against the use of their works by

31. Randall B. Hicks, Requiem for a Parody, 8 HASTINGS J. CoMM. & ENT. L. 55, 58-59 (1985)
(first alteration in original) (quoting ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POETRY AND POETics 600-02 (1965)).

32. See Note, supra note 24, at 1395 (quoting Goetsch, supra note 23, at 41-42).
33. See Susan L. Faaland, Parody and Fair Use: The CriticalQuestion, 57 WASH. L. REV. 163,

192 (1981).
34. See Note, supra note 24, at 1395. Not all parodies copy enough to be considered "substantial" and thus a copyright infringement. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
35. Note, supranote 24, at 1395.
36. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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others."8 The purpose of providing such protection to authors, as is evident from the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, is to promote the
progress of useful arts.39
The purpose of copyright law has been similarly and consistently
summarized by the Supreme Court: "Creative work is to be encouraged
and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts.... [T]he Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic pur-

pose."' Thus, the Copyright Act's grant of monopolistic privileges to
authors clearly is designed to promote the utilitarian goal of increasing the
available pool of creative works for the public's enrichment. The mean
used to achieve this goal is an economic incentive to create; the artists are
given a limited monopoly designed to ensure that they receive a fair return
for their creative efforts.
B. Necessary Limitations on Copyright Protection

All creative works are to some extent derivative. 42 New thoughts or
inventions owe their existence to what has come before. 3 Indeed, "[t]he
world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work of our predecessors."' Therefore, if the Copyright Act granted authors unlimited protec38. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing copyright protection for works of
authorship); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (granting exclusive rights to public performance of literary
works); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (1 Pet.) 591, 660 (1834) (stating that Congress' Act of 1790, pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, secured rights to maps, charts, and books in the authors of such). This
Note considers Congress' most recent comprehensive statute, Copyrights Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
39. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
40. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (citations omitted); see
also Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545-46 (1985) (discussing whether the
press is free to publish excerpts of a copyrighted book); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that Congress balances the interests of authors in controlling exploitation of their work against society's interest in access to information); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954) (stating that protecting the individual is secondary to the advancement of public welfare);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (stating that the primary objective to granting
copyright is to benefit the public through the author's work).
41. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 ("limited grant [of a monopoly] is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved"); Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219 ("The economic philosophy behind... copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors .... ); Fox Film, 286
U.S. at 127 ("The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly
lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.").
42. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503,
511 (1945).
43. Id.
44. Id. Chafee said, " 'A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant can see farther than the giant
himself.' Progress would be stifled if the author had a complete monopoly of everything in his
book ..
" Id. (quotation unattributed in original).
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tion over all aspects of their work products, the pool of creative works
would be stifled.45
Because "copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the
harvest of knowledge,"' the privileges granted to creators by copyright

law must be, and are, limited.47 For example, copyright protection lasts
only for a specified amount of time4 and covers only an author's expres-

sion, not the underlying ideas.49 This limitation prevents authors from
usurping entire realms of thought, and, thus, allows creators to refer to
earlier works." For similar reasons, an artist's secondary use of another

work will not be a copyright infringement unless it is "substantially similar" to the original work.5 Therefore, a "de minimis" use of another's
work is permissible. 2
These limitations obviously serve copyright's purpose of maximizing
information and encouraging creativity.53 However, none of these limitations protect parodies that appropriate a substantial amount of original ex-

45. Id. at 511-14.
46. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985).
47. See id. at 547.
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1988).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). "In no case does copyright protection... extend to any idea."
Id.; see also Harper,471 U.S. at 547 (limiting copyright to expression, inapplicable to facts or ideas);
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (stating there is no
copyright of ideas, only expression); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d
Cir. 1936) (stating that theme or ideas may be appropriated, but not author's expression of them);
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (stating author's copyright protection never extends to their ideas), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
50. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879) (finding no infringement of copyright where
author's bookkeeping scheme was similar to that in prior copyrighted work).
51. See, e.g., Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 443 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that
Pasillas' mask resembling the mask used in McDonald's advertisement was not an infringement because common characteristics were insufficient to establish substantial similiarity). The "substantial
similarity" requirement is judge-made and is not found in the statutory codification of the Copyright
Law. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (stating factors to be considered in determining fair use, among
which, "substantial similiarity" is not listed). Determining whether an alleged infringing work is "substantially similar" is often a difficult task, particularly if the alleged infringing work did not copy
directly from the original. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 25, § 13.03[A], at 13-29 to -30. However, courts have devised a number of tests to define substantial similarity. See, e.g., Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (determining
infringement by "total concept and feel"); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop.
Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 356 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (finding substantial similarity if the use alters the
actual language but tracks the structure of the original).
52. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434-35 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that a taking is
"de minimus only if it is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize
the appropriation"); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that a parodist's taking of four notes from the 100-measure original composition was not a de minimus taking because those four notes were the heart of the original composition), affd per curiam, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
53. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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pression from a copyrighted work. In such cases, parodists must turn to
the fair-use doctrine.
C. History and Purpose of the Fair-UseDoctrine
The fair-use doctrine54 provides an affirmative defense to a copyright

infringement action." Fair use, considered "the most troublesome [issue]
in the whole law of copyright,"56 has been defined as "a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without his consent."57 As developed in the common
law, 8 the fair-use doctrine grants the privilege to use another's copyrighted material for such purposes as criticism and commentary.'
Criticism and commentary are crucial to the maintenance of a vigorous
society.' Indeed, the development of cultural works would stagnate if
copyright law mandated that all future creators be complacent with existing works in their existing forms." In order to criticize, a creator must be
permitted to call attention to the original work62 and, for the parodist,
calling attention to the original may require infringing on the original
author's monopoly over derivative works.63 Thus, but for the creation of
the fair-use defense, the art form of parody could have become extinct-an evidently undesirable result.
The fair-use doctrine limits the scope of the creator's monopoly in

54. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
55. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985); NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 25, § 13.05, at 13-152 to -153 (discussing that because fair use is an affirmative
defense, a court need only consider a claim of fair use if all of the requirements for an infringement
have been met). Therefore, for the fair-use doctrine to apply, the copyright owner must first make a
prima facie showing of an actionable copyright infringement. See id. This necessarily entails showing
that a substantial taking has occurred, for any de minimus taking is simply not actionable. See supra
note 52 and accompanying text. The amount of taking to establish the existence of an infringement
action must not be confused, as it has been, with the third fair-use statutory factor. See Beth W. Van
Hecke, But Seriously, Folks: Toward a Coherent Standard of Parody as Fair Use, 77 MINN. L. REV.
465, 476 n.54 (1992).
56. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
57. HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY § 125, at 260 (1944).
58. The fair-use doctrine was judicially created, see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), and was not codified by Congress until enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act,
see supra note 38 and accompanying text. In the first fair-use case decided in the United States, Justice Story articulated that the interplay between copyright law and fair use made it difficult to arrive at
a satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any general legal principles applicable to all cases. See
Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This section includes a nonexclusive list of possible
purposes, including criticism and comment, which might be deemed appropriate for fair use. See id.
60. See supra notes 33-35, 37-41 and accompanying text.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See supra notes 17-22, 33-35 and accompanying text.
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order to further the utilitarian goals of copyright.' In the words of Justice
Blackmun,
the fair use doctrine plays a crucial role in the law of copyright.... There are situations... in which strict enforcement of
[the copyright] monopoly would inhibit the very "Progress of Science and useful Arts" that copyright is intended to promote....
In such a case, the fair use doctrine... permit[s] the second
author to make limited use of the first author's work for the public
good.'
Thus, in retracting the scope of the author's monopoly over the original work, the fair-use doctrine's purpose, consistent with that of the
Constitution's Copyright Clause and the Copyright Act, is to promote the
utilitarian goal of increasing the available pool of creative works for the
public's enrichment (i.e., to contribute to the progress of the useful arts for
the public's benefit).' Viewed as such, if a use of copyrighted material
serves copyright law's single objective-the promotion of science and the
useful arts-without excessively diminishing the economic incentives for
creativity, then the use should be permitted under the fair-use doctrine.
D. Flexibility of the Fair-UseDoctrine
In the first fair-use case decided in the United States, Folsom v.
Marsh,67 Justice Story articulated that the interplay between copyright
law and fair use made it difficult "to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion,
or to lay down any general principles applicable to all cases."68 More
than a century later, there is still no bright-line approach to fair use.69 As
the Supreme Court explained, fair use is "an 'equitable rule of reason'
which 'permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute
when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is
designed to foster.' "70
Although Congress finally codified the fair-use doctrine7' in 1976,
Congress intended merely to "restate the present judicial doctrine of fair

64.
65.
66.
67.

See supranotes 44-52 and accompanying text.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 477-78 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting) (citations omitted).
See id.
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).

68. Id. at 344.
69. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990).
70. Id. at 236 (citations omitted) (quoting first, Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464
U.S. 417, 448 (1984) and second, Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting
Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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'
use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."72
Therefore, the
codified version of fair use left intact the courts' ultimate discretion by
imposing only flexible guidelines for courts to consider.73 Section 107 of
the Copyright Act provides:

Notwithstanding the... [exclusive rights granted to authors],
the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work
in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.74
By using the words "such as" to describe the possible fair-use purposes,
and "shall include" to describe the factors that a court may consider in a
fair-use analysis,75 Congress laid the foundation for the courts' continued
discretion.

72. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5680; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975); see also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435
(9th Cir. 1986) (stating that § 107 "did not freeze the fair-use doctrine in stone. Rather, Congress
expressly sought to preserve the doctrine's common law character .. "); Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that "Congress made clear
that it in no way intended to depart from Court-created principles or to short-circuit further judicial
development").
73. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (emphasis added). The second factor is based on the notion that
creative works are more deserving of copyright protection than mere factual compilations that, while
labor intensive, require little creativity. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164,
1175 (1994); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-51 (1991) (contrasting
creative works with bare factual compilation, such as a telephone directory); Stewart, 495 U.S. at 23738 (contrasting fictional short story with factual works). Thus, under this factor, a derivative work that
borrows from a creative work is less likely to be deemed a fair use than if it borrowed from a factual
compilation. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE FAIR-USE DOCTRINE TO PARODIES
A. The Emergence of Parody as a Fair Use

Although a congressional report listed parody as an example of a
legitimate fair use,7 6 parody's place within the fair-use confines was not
always respected. The first significant case' considering a parody under the fair-use defense was Benny v. Loew's, Inc.79 In Benny, the movie
studio which owned the copyright to the film "Gaslight" sued to enjoin
"Autolight," comedian Jack Benny's televised parody of -the film.80 The
court found that the original film and Benny's parody were nearly identical." Benny's version merely burlesqued the serious film's expression 2
by adding humorous elements, such as having the actors walk on their
hands as they delivered their lines. 3
In rejecting Benny's contention that the parody was a criticism of the
original, the court found that copyright protection for burlesques as literary
or dramatic criticism would "seem to be a parody upon the meaning of
criticism."8 4 The court stated that parody was not an established area of
fair use and was "to be treated no differently from any other appropriation... if it is determined that there was a substantial taking, infringement exists."85 The court held that Benny's version infringed on the
original's copyright. 6
The Benny courts' rejection of parody as a useful form of criticism

76. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 72, at 65, reprintedin U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5678.

77. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
78. There were a number of cases in the early part of the twentieth century that dealt with parody
and fair use. See Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287, 288 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909) (stating that parody does not
require the singing of a complete song including musicial accompaniment); Green v. Minzensheimer,
177 F. 286, 286 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909) (finding no infringement of a musical where parody did not
include music); Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977, 979 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903) (holding that the
parody at issue was "a distinct and different variety of the histrionic art from [the original], and I do
not think that... [the defendant] has in any way interfered with the legal rights of the complainants").
Typically, these cases involved vaudevillian mimicry of well known-performers. See, e.g., Luby, 177
F. at 288 (mimicking famous singers with musical parody). These cases acknowledged parody as a
protectible art form, but found copyright infringement when the mimicry reduced the demand for the
plaintiff's work. See, e.g., Bloom & Hamlin, 125 F. at 979.

79. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), affd sub
nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd without opinion sub nom. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
80. Id. at 167.
81. Id. at 171.
82. Benny, 239 F.2d at 535. The original, "Gaslight," was a dramatic story about a man who tried
to drive his wife insane. Id. at 534.
83. Id. at 536.
84. Id. at 537.
85. Id. at 536-37 (quoting Loew's, 131 F. Supp. at 183).
86. Id. at 537.
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within fair-use parameters was short-lived. 7 After Benny, courts recognized parody as a legitimate purpose meriting fair-use protection, and gave
parodists leeway to use portions of the original." Indeed, while the Benny appeal was pending, the same trial court that had ruled against Benny
decided Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co. 9
Columbia Pictures dealt with comedian Sid Caesar's television parody
of the film "From Here To Eternity."' The Columbia Pictures court
modified the restricted approach it had taken in Benny, and held that parody is a valuable art form meriting fair-use protection.9' The court stated
that some taking should be permitted so that parodists could conjure up
the original and, thus, achieve their traditional purpose.' 2 Though Columbia Pictures was obviously inconsistent with its earlier decision in Benny,
the court tried to reconcile the two decisions by stating that Caesar, unlike
Benny, had not taken too much from the original.93
The parodist's right to use part of the original took firm hold in Berlin
v. E.C. Publications, Inc.94 The Berlin court considered composer Irving
Berlin's infringement claim against Mad Magazine.95 Mad Magazine published a book of humorous lyrics to be sung to Berlin's and others'
songs.96 For example, defendants converted Berlin's "The Last Time I
Saw Paris," a ballad about pre-war France, to "The First Time I Saw
Maris," a criticism of Roger Mans for the commercialization of his baseball career.97 Similarly, "A Pretty Girl Is Like a Melody" became in
defendant's hands "Louella Schwarz Describes Her Malady."98 The court
found Mad's book of lyrics noninfringing because there was no substantial
similarity" between the parodic lyrics and the lyrics of the original
songs."

87. See Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544-45 (2d Cir.) (listing critiques), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Victor S. Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry
and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 235 (1962). While the Benny appeal was pending, the same trial court that decided Benny modified Benny's restricted approach in Columbia Pictures
Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
88. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures, 137 F. Supp. at 350.
89. 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1995).
90. See id. at 351, 358.
91. See id. at 350.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 351 (stating that unlike Benny, "there was only a taking sufficient to cause the
viewer to recall and conjure up the original").
94. 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
95. Id. at 542.
96. Id. at 543.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
100. Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545. The court articulated that "[tihe disparities in theme, content and
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Despite finding no infringement, the Berlin court, in dictum, outlined
the parameters for parody under a fair-use analysis:
[Wlhere, as here... the parody has neither the intent nor the
effect of fulfilling the demand for the original, and where the
parodist does not appropriate a greater amount of the original
work than is necessary to "recall or conjure up" the object of his
satire, a finding of infringement would be improper."'
The Berlin court's dictum not only cemented parody's accepted place
within the fair-use framework, but also set out two principle tests that
courts use in parody-fair-use cases:
(1) The market substitution test-whether the parody fulfills the demand for the original; e 2 and
(2) The "conjure up" test-whether the parody uses more than is necessary to conjure up the object of the satire."°
After the Berlin decision, courts used and even expanded the Berlin tests
in order to find parodies to be fair uses.'O
B. Expansion of FairUse to Accommodate Parodies

In the 1980 decision of Elsmere Music v. National Broadcasting
Co.,0 5 the court considered whether the television program Saturday
Night Live's parody of the commercial jingle "I Love New York" infringed the original creator's copyright to the jingle."° In New York's
1977 television campaign to improve the city's image, a chorus line 'of7
dancing showgirls chanted "I-I-I-I-I Love New Yo-o-o-o-o-o-rk.'
The Saturday Night Live parody involved the poor public image of the
biblical city of Sodom."'5 The fictitious town council was worried about
Sodom's image because of the perceived negative public attitude towards
the act of sodomy. The cast solved Sodom's dilemma with an advertising
style between the original lyrics and the alleged infringements could hardly be greater." Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 543. This is akin to the fourth factor listed in the fair-use codification. See 17 U.S.C. §
107 (1988).
103. Berlin, 329 F.2d at 544-45. This is akin to the third factor listed in the fair-use codification.

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
104. See infra notes 105-33 and accompanying text. The Second and the Ninth Circuits have decided the vast majority of parody as fair-use cases. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 440 (9th
Cir. 1986) (finding parody as fair use); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d
252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980) (same).
105. 482 F. Supp. 741, 741 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
106. Id. at 743.
107. Id.
108. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

campaign: the cast formed a small chorus line and sang "I Love Sodom"
several times to the tune of "I Love New York."' 9
The district court applied the guidelines of section 107 of the Copyright Act"' and found that Saturday Night Live's parody was a fair use
of the copyrighted jingle."' The court stated that, although the parody
appropriated "the heart of the composition,1 1 2 the parody did not compete with, or fulfill the demand for, the original work." 3 In affirming the
district court, the court of appeals stated that, "in today's world of often
unrelieved
solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to the humor of
14
parody."'

The court of appeals, in fact, advocated the expansion of the fair-use
doctrine to accommodate parodies." 5 In rejecting the "conjure up" standard as a limit to the amount of the original the parodist may use (the
second statutory factor), the court stated:
The District Court concluded ... that the parody did not make
more extensive use of appellant's song than was necessary to
"conjure up" the original. While we agree with this conclusion, we
note that the concept of "conjuring up" an original came into the
copyright law not as a limitation on how much of an original may
be used, but as a recognition that a parody frequently needs to be
more than a fleeting evocation of an original in order to make its
humorous point. A parody is entitled at least to "conjure up" the
original. Even more extensive use would still be fair use, provided
the parody builds upon the original, using the original as a known
element of modem culture and contributing
something new for
6
humorous effect or commentary.'
The Elsmere Music court's expansion
of the "conjure up" standard was
7
Dees.'
v.
Fisher
by
followed

109. Id.
110. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
111. Elsmere Music, 482 F. Supp. at 744-45.
112. Id. at 744.
113. Id. at 747.
114. Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 253 n.1 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Although the Elsmere Music court
claimed that the "conjure up" standard was never meant as a limitation on the amount of an original
that a parodist could use, id., this claim seems to be merely a judicial "sleight of hand" to rewrite
precedent while pretending to follow it.
117. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). The expansion of the "conjure up" standard in the Second Circuit Elsmere Music opinion, Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253 n.1, which was followed by the Ninth
Circuit opinion in Dees, Dees, 794 F.2d at 438-39 (quoting Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253 n.1),
meant that the two circuits that decide the vast majority of fair-use cases, see supra note 104, at least
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In Dees, owners of the copyrighted song "When Sunny Gets Blue"
claimed that Rick Dees infringed the copyright with his commercial parody "When Sonny Sniffs Glue.""' The parody, released on Dees' comedy
album, copied the main theme of the original and substituted the original's
lyrics---"When Sunny gets blue, her eyes get gray and cloudy, then the
rain begins to fall"--to "When Sonny sniffs glue, her eyes get red and
bulgy, then her hair begins to fall.""..9 The district court held the parody
to be a fair use and granted summary judgment for Dees. 2 °
The court of appeals affirmed' and stated that the parodist is at
least entitled to conjure up the original" and, thus, Dees was entitled to
use "the heart of the [original] composition"'" to make his parody.'24
In assessing the economic effect of the parody on the original-the fourth
statutory factor-the court of appeals found that the parody did not supplant the market for the original."z Plaintiffs contended that the fourth
factor weighed in their favor because the parody competed in the
original's market of records and tapes." However, the court held that
the proper measure for the fourth factor was whether the parody fulfilled
the demand for the original, not whether the parody competes in the same
market, or reduces the market for the original by discrediting it. 27 Finding that consumers desirous of a romantic ballad would not be satisfied
with a raucous parody, the court held that the parody did not fulfill the
demand for the original."as
The Dees court found the parody to be a fair use despite the contrary
arguments plaintiffs easily derived from the four statutory factors: 29 (1)
The commercial nature of Dees' parody would seem to dictate against a
finding of fair use under the first statutory factor; 30 (2) the creative nature of the original copyrighted song militates against a finding of fair use
under the second statutory factor; (3) the parody's use of the heart of
the original song militates against a finding of fair use under the third

for this factor, intended to follow the same standard in deciding fair-use cases.
118. Dees, 794 F.2d at 434.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 438.
123. Id. at 439 n.5 (quoting Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253 n.1).
124. See id. at 439.
125. Id. at 438.
126. Id. at 436.
127. Id. at 438.
128. Id.
129. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
131. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988).
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statutory factor; 32 and (4) the fact that the parody competed in the same
market as the original 33would support a finding against fair use under the
fourth statutory factor.1

C. General Non-Protection of Distasteful Parody
1. Using the Flexible Statutory Fair-Use Factors
to Censor Distasteful Parody
Despite the acceptance of parody as a legitimate fair-use purpose by
Columbia Pictures and Berlin, 34 and despite the expansion of the doc-35
trine to accommodate more extensive uses in Elsmere Music and Dees,1
courts have not applied the fair-use doctrine so generously when the parodies were too distasteful. While the Copyright Act 36 is content neutral, 37 the cases reveal that courts have used the discretion inherent in
the fair-use
framework to deny protection to sexually explicit or distasteful
38
parodies.
In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates,139 the Air Pirates counterculture comic books placed famous Disney characters, such as Mickey
Mouse and Donald Duck, in adult settings." In Disney's infringement
suit, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that even though Air Pirates did not copy any specific illustrations or literary representations of

132. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988).
133. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988); Dees, 794 F.2d at 436.
134. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 103-33 and accompanying text.
136. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
137. See, e.g., Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 854-56 (5th Cir.
1979). The Mitchell court commented on the Copyright Act's neutrality:
Congress has enacted two statutory copyright restrictions that were arguably content based,
but afterwards repealed them. After the language "composition designed or suited for public
representation," ... was construed.., to mean that the moral content of the work had to
be suitable for public consumption (rather than the more natural meaning of "suited" by
form, i.e. capable of being performed on the stage), Congress deleted the "suited" language
from the next version of the Act....
A later version [of the Act] ... contained language
arguably placing content restrictions on the copyrightability of engravings, cuts and
prints.... After this language was narrowly construed by the Supreme Court....
the language was deleted from the 1909 version of the Act....
Id. at 855 n.4.
138. See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub
nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443,
452-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff d as modified, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981); infra notes 139-59 and accompanying text.
139. See 581 F,2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods.,
439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
140. Id. at 752-53.
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the Disney characters, Air Pirates' copying of the actual design of the
characters was so substantial as to preclude a fair-use finding."4 ' Moreover, after denying Air Pirates' fair-use defense, ostensibly because of the
substantiality of the taking, the court further illuminated the basis for its
decision:
While Disney sought only to foster "an image of innocent delightfulness," defendants supposedly sought to convey an allegorical
message of significance. Put politely by one commentator, "the
Air Pirates... placed... Disney cartoon characters in incongruous settings where they engaged in activities clearly antithetical to
the accepted Mickey Mouse world of scrubbed faces, bright smiles
and happy endings." It centered around "a rather bawdy depiction
of the Disney characters as active members of a free thinking,
promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture."'42
The content-neutral nature of the Copyright Act'43 makes clear that the
salacious or distasteful content of a parody is irrelevant to the legal determination of fair use.'" However, in light of the court's negative
characterization of Air Pirates' parody, it is at best arguable that the substantiality of the taking was the only significant criterion the court considered in denying Air Pirates' fair-use claim.
As in Air Pirates, the sexual nature of a parody seemed to weigh
heavily against a finding of fair use in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson.'45 In Wilson,
defendants produced an off-Broadway play entitled "Let My People
Come," characterized as a sexual musical.'" In the production, the actors
performed the music to "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B," but
altered the lyrics to "Cunnilingus Champion of Company C."' 47 The
original composer of the song claimed infringement, and defendants invoked the fair-use defense.' 48
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals purportedly relied on the four
statutory fair-use factors' 49 to deny defendants' fair-use claim. 5 ' First,

141. Id.
142. Id. at 753 (quoting Note, Parody, Copyrights and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F. L. REV.
564, 571, 582 (1976)).
143. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 131 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (stating
that the Copyright Act has been determined to protect all creative works, whether obscene or not).
145. 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd as modified, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
146. Wilson, 677 F.2d at 181.
147. Id. at 181-82.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 182-83. The court stated that, although the statutory factors were not controlling,
the factors did serve as "guideposts" for the consideration of whether the allegedly infringing use was
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the court emphasized that defendant's use was for commercial gain. 5 '
Second, the creative nature of the original work supported the finding that
the use was not fair.'52 Third, the court upheld the lower court's finding
that the taking was substantial.'53 In considering the fourth statutory factor, the court "start[ed] from the premise that the songs were competing
works'15 4 and presumed that the parody had a negative impact on the
original's market'55 because the works "were competitors in the entertainment field."'56 In summarizing its findings, the court stated, "[w]e are
not prepared to hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a
competitor's copyrighted song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform
it for commercial gain, and then escape liability by calling the end result a
parody.' 57
The claim that the court's finding of no fair use was based on the
statutory factors is undermined by the court's indulgence in irrelevant
commentary about its disdain for the parody's "dirty lyrics."'5 8 The majority opinion used a columnist's description to characterize defendants'
parody as an " 'erotic nude show' with 'sex content raunchy enough to
satisfy the most jaded porno palate.' ""', The dissenting judge chided the
improper moral basis for the majority's decision:
[T]he defendants' use of "dirty lyrics" or of language and allusions that I might personally find distasteful or even offensive is
wholly irrelevant to the issue before us, which is whether the
defendants' use, obscene or not, is permissible under the fair use
doctrine.... We cannot, under the guise of deciding a copyright
issue,
act as a board of censors outlawing X-rated performanc6
10

es.

By examining the facts of both Air Pirates and Wilson in light of
other applications of the statutory factors by the Second and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeal,' 6 1 it is arguable that the judges manipulated the fairfair. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988)).
150. Id. at 185.
151. See id.
152. See id.
at 182, 185.
153. Id. at 185. The court of appeals stated that, on these facts, it might have reached a different
conclusion on the substantiality issue, but that the lower court's finding was not clearly erroneous. Id.
154. Id. at 183.
155. See id. at 185.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 181 (quoting an unnamed columnist).
160. Id. at 191 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
161. It is worth noting that the denial of fair-use protection in Wilson was by the Second Circuit
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use doctrine to censor parodies merely because they found them immoral
or personally distasteful. In neither Air Piratesnor Wilson were the parodies more "commercial" than the parodies upheld as fair uses in Elsmere
Music and Dees.62 Thus, the first statutory fair-use factor, based on its
application in Elsmere Music and Dees, should have supported fair-use
findings in Air Pirates and Wilson. Moreover, the nature of the copyrighted work-the second statutory factor-was the same in Air Pirates and
Wilson as it was in both Elsmere Music and Dees.63 Each of the parodies in these cases was based on a creative original work.1"
The third statutory factor, the substantiality of the taking from the
original, seemed to weigh against a fair-use finding in Elsmere Music and
Dees. The parody involved in Elsmere Music appropriated "the heart of
the [original] composition" by borrowing two of the four words and all
four of the musical notes in the original's main theme." The Dees parody changed many of the original lyrics, but kept all of the original's main
theme." Nevertheless, the parodies in both Elsmere Music and Dees
were held to be fair uses. 6 Significantly smaller takings in both Air Pirates and Wilson, however, ostensibly precluded a finding of fair use."
The fact that the fair-use defense was disallowed based upon the substantiality of the taking in Wilson is especially troubling as the Second Circuit
Wilson court was bound by its earlier decision in Elsmere Music, where it
adopted the lower court's expansive interpretation for applying the third

statutory factor.'69
Court of Appeals, the same court that, just one year earlier, had affirmed the lower court's expansion
of the fair-use protection for parodies in Elsmere Music. Moreover, the court of appeals that rejected
the Air Pirates fair-use defense, the Ninth Circuit, was the same court that penned the more liberal
Dees opinion. While the Dees opinion was written eight years after the Air Piratesopinion, dictum in
the Dees opinion confirms this Note's claim that, in analyzing fair-use claims, courts do consider the
salacious nature of the parody. The Dees court wrote:
The composers [plaintiffs] also claim that the parody is immoral and thus unprotected by
the fair-use doctrine. They cite the parody's irreverent references to drug addiction and its
purported use of obscenities. Assuming without deciding that an obscene use is not a fair
use ....we conclude, after listening to it, that the parody is innocuous-silly perhaps, but
surely not obscene or immoral.
Dees, 794 F.2d at 438.
162. See supra notes 102-25 and accompanying text.
163. See Dees, 794 F.2d at 434 (involving the song "When Sonny Gets Blue"); Wilson, 677 F.2d
at 182 (involving the song "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy"); Elsmere Music v. National Broadcasting
Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving the song "I Love New York"); Walt Disney Prods.
v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir. 1978) (involving Disney characters).
164. See supra note 163.
165. Elsmere Music, 482 F. Supp. at 744.
166. Dees, 794 F.2d at 434.
167. Id.; Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253.
168. See Wilson, 677 F.2d at 184; Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 753.
169. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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The fourth statutory factor, the parody's effect on the original's potential market, clearly favored a finding of fair use in Air Pirates and Wilson
under the Dees interpretation.17 The pornographic rendition of the Disney characters in Air Pirates and the pornographic rendition of the "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy" song in Wilson would not satisfy the demand for
the sweet original versions in those cases any more than Rick Dees' raucous parody would satisfy the consumer demand for the original romantic
ballad in Dees.'
The denial of fair-use protection for Air Pirates and Wilson arguably
stems from the judicial disdain for the distasteful humor used by those
parodies. These two decisions are not the only ones in which parodies
were denied fair-use protection due to their salacious content.' However, it is evident from these two decisions alone that the discretion afforded
the courts under the flexible fair-use factors can be abused and lead to
judicial censorship." 3

170. Compare Dees, 794 F.2d at 438 (stating "the economic effect of a parody with which we are
concerned is not its potential to destroy or diminish the market for the original ... but rather whether
it fulfills the demand for the original") (emphasis in original) with Wilson, 677 F.2d at 184 (involving
a parody of "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy" that " '... deals with the humorous practice of cunnilingus .. '")and Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 753 (discussing the use of wholesome Disney characters in
incongruous, bawdy settings).
171. See Dees, 794 F.2d at 434; Wilson, 677 F.2d at 184; Air Pirates,581 F.2d at 753.
172. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242 n.8 (2d Cir. 1983)
(finding that while parody is usually a fair use, a "limiting principle arises when attempts at parody
take the form of scatological humor"); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (characterizing defendants' film, "Debbie Does Dallas" as " a gross
and revolting sex film" and stating that use of the cheerleaders' uniform in the final scene in which
explicit sexual acts were performed hardly qualified as a parody meriting fair-use protection). The
Pussycat court also noted that although the obscene nature of the parody was not at issue, the court
still characterized the film as having a "gross and revolting nature." Id. at 202, 206 n.10; DC Comics
Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118-19 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (concluding that
when defendants' parody tarnishes the image that plaintiff has worked diligently to create, the use
cannot be considered fair); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). In Mature Pictures,the court denied fair use protection for the use of the song "Mickey Mouse
March" in the film "The Life and Times of the Happy Hooker." Id. at 1398. In the "Happy Hooker,"
the "March" served as background music while three young men sporting only Mousekateer hats were
sexually gratified, simultaneously, by one woman. Id. at 1397-98. The defendants claimed that the use
of the March in such an incongruous setting was intended to emphasize the transition from childhood
to manhood in a comical setting. Id. at 1398. The court, however, regarded defendants' use as a "display of bestiality to parody life" and held that the defendants' commercial parody was not a fair use.
Id. But see Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 131 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (stating that
the Copyright Act has been determined to protect all creative works, whether obscene or not, and
therefore declining to consider the salacious content of "Screw Magazine's" parody of the Pillsbury
doughboy in assessing its validity under the fair-use defense).
173. See supra notes 160-72 and accompanying text.
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2. Needed Revision of the Statutory Fair-Use
Factors by the Supreme Court
In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,'74 the United States Supreme
Court expressly decided for the first time whether, and to what extent, a
parody could support a fair-use defense to copyright infringement.' 5 The
Supreme Court opinion in Acuff-Rose makes strides toward eliminating
confusion on how to apply the four statutory fair-use factors when
parodists claim fair use.'76 The Court's clarification of how to properly
apply the statutory fair-use factors has made it significantly more likely
that parodists will be able to successfully defend copyright infringement
actions by claiming fair use. It is important to note at the outset, however,
that the Acuff-Rose Court's more liberal formulation regarding the fair-use
factors applies only to cases that involve "true parodies"; (i.e., the allegedly infringing work must actually comment on or critique the original work,
rather than merely use the original work as a vehicle to make fun of
something else)."v
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. owns the copyright to Roy Orbison's classic
song "Oh, Pretty Woman."'7 After the rap group 2 Live Crew recorded
an ostensible parody of Orbison's song and included it on its album,
Acuff-Rose sued for copyright infringement.'79 In defending the action
for copyright infringement, 2 Live Crew predictably claimed that its parody was a fair use.' 0 The district court agreed that 2 Live Crew's song
was a parody entitled to fair-use protection and granted summary judgment in the 'group's favor.''
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and held
that 2 Live Crew's "Pretty Woman" was not a fair use of Orbison's copyrighted original song.' 2 Though begrudgingly accepting the district
174. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
175. See id. at 1171. Only once before had the United States Supreme Court been confronted with
the issue of whether a parody could support a fair-use defense to copyright infringement. See id. at
1171 (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), affg sub. nom
Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956). The first time the Court was confronted with the
issue, the Court was equally divided and, thus, issued no written opinion. Id. (citing Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 356 U.S. at 43).
176. See id. at 1171-79.
177. See infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
178. Id. at 1168.
179. Id. Luther Campbell of 2 Live Crew wrote "Pretty Woman" in 1989. Id. Mr. Campbell contended that his song, "through comical lyrics [was meant] to satirize the original." Id. Prior to releasing the record, 2 Live Crew's manager contacted Acuff-Rose and offered to pay a fee for use of
Orbison's original song, but Acuff-Rose rejected the offer. Id. Nonetheless, 2 Live Crew's album was
released with the "Pretty Woman" track. Id.
180. Id.
181. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1160 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
182. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992) (remanding the
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court's determination that 2 Live Crew's rap song was even a parody,'83
the court of appeals focused on the statutory fair-use factors 8and
resolved
4
Crew.
Live
2
for
use
fair
of
finding
a
all four factors against
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court,'85 deciding expressly
for the first time how to apply the statutory fair-use factors in a parody
case. 8 6 Regarding the first factor, the purpose and character of the use,
the Court stated that, although the commerciality of the use weighs against
a fair-use finding, such a determination is not dispositive of this factor.'87 Rather, the purpose of the first factor in the parody context is to
determine "whether and to what extent the new work is
'transformative.' "88 The Court reasoned that copyright law's goal of
promoting the arts is furthered when the secondary work "adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message."'89
The Court found that 2 Live Crew's song was transformative because
it added to the original.' More importantly, the Court found that 2 Live
Crew's purpose was to parody the original.' 9' 2 Live Crew achieved this
parodic purpose, according to the Court, because the 2 Live Crew version

case back to the district but also stating that "[t]he four factors . . . support the conclusion that 2 Live
Crew's use.. . was not a fair use").
183. Id. at 1435-36 n.8.
184. Id. at 1439.
185. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1179.
186. Id. at 1171-79.
187. Id. at 1174. Before the Supreme Court's Acuff-Rose decision, a court could easily use the
commerciality prong of the first factor to deny fair-use protection to parodies. See, e.g, Acuff-Rose,
972 F.2d at 1436 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). However, it is clear from the statutory language that, as merely a subsidiary part of one fair-use factor, the
commerciality of the use should not be wholly determinative of the fair-use balance. See 17 U.S.C. §
107 (1988). Despite this, the Court stated in dictum that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation" of the owner's copyright. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). But, in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539 (1985), the Court's next consideration of fair use, the Court tempered the Sony statement by
stating that commerciality is but one element of the fair-use balance, a finding of which "tends to
weigh against a finding of fair use." Id. at 562.
Few uses will be purely commercial or purely nonprofit. If the fair-use doctrine required that
uses be non-commercial, then the fair-use defense would be virtually obliterated for parodies. Certainly, most parodies involve some expectation of monetary gain. As Samuel Johnson said, " '[n]o man
but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money.' " JAMES BOswELL, THE LIFE OF JOHNSON (Christopher Hibbert ed., Penguin Books 1979) (1791). Therefore, if courts were permitted to continue considering the commerciality of the parody as a determinative factor, judges could easily use this factor as a
means to enjoin any distasteful commercial parody. Thus, the Supreme Court's rejection in Acuff-Rose
of the determinative nature of this inquiry is an important step in the protection of parodies under the
fair-use doctrine.
188. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct at 1171.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 1173.
191. Id.
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actually commented on and criticized Orbison's original song.'" Once
the Court determined that 2 Live Crews's song was a "true parody," the
Court resolved the first fair-use factor in 2 Live Crew's favor, 93 with
the
94
other fair-use factors falling into place in favor of "true parodists."'
The Court also resolved the second fair-use factor, the nature of the
original copyrighted work, in favor of 2 Live Crew."5 In fact, the Court
essentially wrote the second factor out of fair-use analysis when parody is
involved by stating that: This factor is never "likely to help much in separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case, since
parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works."'"
As interpreted by the Court, the third fair-use factor is whether the

amount and substantiality of material that the secondary user copied from
the original copyrighted work is reasonable in relation to the purpose of
the copying.' 9 2 Live Crew's purpose, according to the Court, was to
make a parody.' The Court found that when a parody is involved, even
taking the heart of the original is not necessarily excessive copying, as
long as the parody is transformative-i.e., as long as the parody adds to
the original.' 9 Because 2 Live Crew's parody did not merely copy the
heart of the original, but also added to and commented on the original, the
Court resolved this factor in favor of 2 Live Crew.'o
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1175-78.
195. Id. at 1175.
196. Id. Courts have interpreted the second statutory factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, to
mean that a fair-use analysis should be more scrutinizing when the original work was creative, imaginative, and original. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217,
221 (D.NJ. 1977). Similarly, if the original work required a substantial investment of time and labor
rather than a substantial amount of creativity, a fair-use defense would be more easily sustained. See,
e.g., Wainright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1014 (1978). These interpretations are consistent with copyright law's aims of providing
economic incentives for creative works and maximizing information for the public benefit.
However, as the Acuff-Rose Court realized, a parody relies on using "some elements of a prior
author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author's works."
Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct at 1172. Parodies typically use creative works as the vehicle to effectuate criticism. See id. This is necessarily the case because, in order to parody an original work, the public must
be familiar with the original and the public is generally more familiar with creative works. Therefore,
if there were a presumption against fair use when the original work was "creative," then there would
be a presumption of non-fair use for most parodies. See id. at 1175. Such a presumption against parodies is antithetical to the goals of copyright As all types of works should be subject to criticism, and
as parodies of any type of work add to the stockpile of the arts, even parodies of creative works
should be amenable to a fair-use defense. Id. at 1172-73. Thus, the Supreme Court's resolution of this
issue in favor of parodists in Acuff-Rose has taken from the lower courts another tool that could be
used to censor parodies.
197. Acuff-Rose, 114S. Ct at 1175.
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1176. The Court determined that 2 Live Crew copied no more of the lyrics than neces-
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The fourth fair-use factor is the effect of the secondary use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."' The Court's
analysis of this factor also seemed to favor parodists. The Court stated that
it is unlikely that a parody would "affect the market for the original in' 2°a
way cognizable under this factor, that is, by acting as a substitute for it."

sary to achieve the parodic purpose. Id. However, the Court remanded for a factual determination of
whether 2 Live Crew copied more of the music than was necessary. Id. at 1176-77.
This third statutory factor is a limiting principle on the quantitative or qualitative amount of
material that a secondary user may borrow from the original. Id. at 1176. According to the statutory
language, the more original material that the secondary user borrows, the more unlikely that the use
will be deemed fair. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988). Parodies, by their very nature, require substantial
use of the original work in order to clearly conjure up the original in the minds of the public. AcuffRose, 114 S. Ct. at 1176. Thus, judges may easily apply this third factor to deny fair-use protection to
any parody they deem distasteful. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose did little to establish clear parameters for lower courts to follow when considering this factor. The only parameter that
lower courts can glean from the Court's analysis of this third factor is that, in appropriate circumstances, it is permissible to copy the heart of the original. See id.
In the author's opinion, the Supreme Court did not go nearly far enough in its analysis of this
factor. In light of copyright's goals, a parodist should be entitled to use as much of the original as
necessary in order to best effectuate the parody's purpose. The goal of copyright would certainly not
be well served if parodists were forced to create ineffective parodies because they were limited in the
amount of the original they could use. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals correctly stated in
Elsmere Music, a parodist's extensive use of an original should "still be fair use, provided the parody
builds upon the original, using the original as a known element of modem culture and contributing
something new for humorous effect or commentary." Elsmere Music, 623 F.2d at 253 n.1.
201. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1177-78.
202. Id. at 1177. However, since this factor requires consideration of the potential market for the
original, the Court remanded for a determination of whether 2 Live Crew's rap parody would harm
Acuff-Rose's ability to license rap versions of Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman." Id. at 1178-79.
In Acuff-Rose, the Court receded from earlier statements made in its fair-use decisions about
the importance of the fourth factor. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. National Enters., 471 U.S.
539 (1985), the Court stated that the effect of the use on the potential market for the copyrighted work
"is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use." Id. at 566. Moreover, in Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the Court stated that a fair-use analysis should
focus primarily on the effect of the secondary use on the market for the original, and that "[i]f the
intended use is for commercial gain," the likelihood of significant harm to the original's market may
be presumed. Id. at 449-51.
However, the Acuff-Rose Court said that, a presumption of market harm when the secondary
use was commercial was inappropriate when the secondary use is a parody because the parody and the
original will generally serve different market functions. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1177-78. The Court
also reminded lower courts that if a parody reduces demand for the original by criticizing it to the
extent that the public appreciate's the flaws in the original, such a harm to the market is not cognizable under a fair-use analysis. Id. at 1178. An extremely critical parody could highlight weaknesses in
the original and thereby reduce demand for the original. Id. The Court noted that "the role of the
courts is to distinguish between '[bliting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright
infringement[, which] usurps it.' " Id. (quoting Dees, 794 F.2d at 438) (brackets in original).
While the Acuff-Rose Court laudably prohibited lower courts from considering the scathing
effects a parody might have on the original in the fourth factor analysis, the Court did not, in my
opinion, go far enough in illuminating the rationale behind this fourth fair-use factor. The addition of
parodies to society's stockpile of creative works is consistent with copyright's goals. It is only "[w]hen
the injury to the copyright holder's potential market would substantially impair the incentive to create
works for publication, [that] the objectives of the copyright law require that this factor weigh heavily
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The Supreme Court's analysis in Acuff-Rose of how to apply the fairuse factors to parodies did, in some ways, limit the discretion that lower
courts previously had in this area. When the secondary use is a true parody, lower courts no longer may dismiss the parody as a non-fair use simply because it is commercial, °3 or because it copied the heart ° of an
original creative work." 5 Additionally, the Court held that its earlier
statement about presuming harm to the original's market when the secondary use was commercial, is improper when analyzing parodies under the
fourth fair-use factor. However, while the Acuff-Rose Court limited the
lower court's discretion by clarifying how the fair-use factors are to be
applied when a "true parodist" claims fair use, the Court's definitional
approach to what a parody is for purposes of the Acuff-Rose analysis has
given lower courts more discretion than ever to censor that which is distasteful.
3. Using the Supreme Court-Mandated Definitional
Approach to Censor Distasteful Parody
In Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court stated that, in order to be considered
a parody and to come within the Court's fair-use analysis of parody, the
secondary work must be a true parody, commenting on or critiquing the
original work.' The Court distinguished parody, which must critique
the original work,s from satire, which uses the original work to comment on follies or vices of society.' The Court reasoned that if the secondary work does not actually comment on or critique the original in

against the secondary user." Pierre N. Leval, Toward a FairUse Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1125 (1990).
It is highly unlikely that creation of a parody will ever substantially impair copyright's economic incentive system because, as the Second Circuit noted:
[A]ny work of sufficient notoriety to be the object of parody has already secured for its
proprietor considerable financial benefit. According that proprietor further protection against
parody does little to promote creativity, but it places a substantial inhibition upon the creativity of authors adept at using parody to entertain, inform, or stir public consciousness.
Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1983). It is only
when the parody displaces the market for the original that copyright's economic incentive to create
would be severely hampered. See Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct at 1177-78.
203. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.

204. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
206. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1177; see supra note 202 and accompanying text.
207. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1172.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1172 n.15. The Court stated that "[plarody needs to mimic an original to make its
point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim's (or collective victims') imagination,
whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing." Id. at 1172.
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some way, then the Acuff-Rose analysis would be improper because there
would be no justification for the secondary work to borrow from the original:
If ...the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or
style of the original composition, [and] ...the alleged infringer
merely uses [the original composition] to get attention or to avoid
the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness
in borrowing from another's work diminishes accordingly (ifit
does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its
commerciality, loom larger."'
If the secondary work criticizes or comments on the original, then the
secondary work is a parody meriting the favorable fair-use analysis enunciated by the Court in Acuff-Rose." ' If, however, the secondary work
merely uses the original to criticize or comment on society (or on anything
other than the original work), then the secondary work is not a parody
and, thus, does not merit the fair-use protection articulated in AcuffRose. 2 Thus, as an integral part of a fair-use analysis, the Supreme
Court has now expressly required lower courts to determine whether the
allegedly infringing work is a true parody or just a mere "satire."
In order to make this determination, lower courts must ascertain the
alleged parody's critical relationship to the original."' Permitting courts
to make such a determination, however, is akin to making the judges critics of the art world. Like art critics, judges will have to determine what
the work means in order to determine whether the work is criticizing the
work from which it borrowed, rather than just criticizing society. The
Court attempted to temper the scope of such lower-court inquiries by
stating that "[t]he threshold question when fair use is raised indefense of
parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived."2"4
Moreover, the Court stated that the good or bad taste of the parody "does
not and should not matter" in this determination." 5
Despite the Court's attempt to limit the scope of lower courts' inquiries, requiring a court to determine whether the allegedly infringing work
is a true parody is completely unworkable, and, indeed, will give courts
practically unfettered discretion to discard any distasteful work as an in-

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 1172 (emphasis added).
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1172 n.14.
Id. at 1173.
Id.
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fringing non-parody. This conclusion is easily gleaned not only from the
two lower court opinions in Acuff-Rose, but also from Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion.
Federal district court judges, federal appellate court judges, and United
States Supreme Court Justices are presumably reasonable, intelligent people. Thus, one might suppose that the determination in an individual case
of "whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived"2 6' would
be fairly uniform among such reasonable people. The Acuff-Rose case,
however, clearly disproves this supposition. The district court found 2
Live Crew's rap song to be a true parody of the original song.21 The
district court found that, by changing many of the original's sweet lyrics
into shocking ones, and by singing off key and adding "scraper sounds," 2
Live Crew actually critiqued Orbison's original "Pretty Woman" as being
"bland and banal."" 8 The district court wrote that the parody
quickly degenerates into a play on words, substituting predictable
lyrics with shocking ones. The first lyrical hint that something is
amiss comes when a loud, barking laugh immediately follows the
first two words of the parody, "pretty woman."... The purpose
of the laughter is soon explained as the ensuing choruses respectively depict a big, hairy woman, a bald-headed woman, and a
"two-timin" woman. Roy Orbison's pretty woman becomes akin to
"Cousin It," the ugly, bit character featured on the TV series "The
Addams Family." The physical attributes of the subject woman
deviate from a pleasing image of feminity to bald-headed, hairy
and generally repugnant. To complete the thematic twist, at the
end of the parody the "two-timin" woman turns out to be pregnant. The phrase, "the baby ain't mine" is completely inconsistent
with the tone and story of the romantic original. In sum, 2 Live
Crew is an anti-establishment rap group and this song derisively
demonstrates how bland and banal the Orbison song seems to
them .....
The parody also employs a number of musical devices that
exaggerate the original and help to create a comic effect. 2 Live
Crew... inserts a heavily distorted "scraper," indicating a significant disparity in style ..... Also at the beginning of the parody,
the first soloist sings in a different key than the chorus. In addition, four times during the parody, 2 Live Crew repeats Orbison's
bass riff over and over again ... until the riff begins to sound like

216. Id.
217. Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1155.
218. Id.
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an annoying scratch on a record.2" 9
The dissent in the court of appeals' opinion agreed with the district
court's determination that the rap song was a true parody of Orbison's
original.22 The dissenting judge stated that:
The parody (done in an African-American dialect) was clearly
intended to ridicule the white-bread original-and if a higher
criticism is necessary to qualify the derivative work as true parody, such criticism is readily discernible .... Consider the
plot ... of the original work .... The singer evokes a sexual
theme in his soliloquy, but then leaves the realization of his desire
to the listener's imagination [while] [t]he parody by 2 Live Crew
is much more explicit, and reminds us that sexual congress with
nameless streetwalkers is not necessarily the stuff of romance and
is not necessarily without its consequences. The singers ...have
the same thing on their mind as did the lonely man with the nasal
voice, but here there is no hint of wine and roses. The 2 Live
Crew singers-randy misogynists, not lonely Sir
Lancelots-raucously address a "big hairy woman" and her "baldheaded friend," one or both of whom are urged to "let the boys
jump in." One singer chides a woman (the big hairy one, I think)
for having cheated on him ... [but] [i]n the end, this cloud proves
to have what the singer sees as a silver lining [because the baby
wasn't his].
2 Live Crew "Pretty Woman" is hopelessly vulgar, to be sure,
[but] the vulgarity ... is the message. [Orbison's] original work
may not seem vulgar, at first blush, but the 2 Live Crew group are
telling us, knowingly or unknowingly, that vulgar is precisely
what "Oh, Pretty Woman" is221
Moreover, the Supreme Court agreed that 2 Live Crew's song was
parodic in nature.222 The majority opinion stated that
2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose
fantasy comes ture, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for
sex, and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later
words can be taken as a comment on the naivete of the original of
an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores the ugli-

219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1441 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1442-46 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1173.
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ness of street life and the debasement that it signifies. It is this
joinder of reference and ridicule that marks . . . the
author's ... parody.n
However, unlike the district court, the dissenter in the court of appeals, and the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, the majority in the
court of appeals could not perceive a parodic character in 2 Live Crew's
rap song. 4 The court of appeals wrote:
[E]ven accepting that [2 Live Crew's] "Pretty Woman" is a comment on the banality of white-centered popular music, we cannot
discern any parody of the original song. Failing a direct comment
on the original, there can be no parody.
... [T]his is not a new work which makes ridiculous the
style and expression of the original, although there is plainly an
element of the ridiculous to the new work. We cannot see any
thematic relationship between the copyrighted song and the alleged parody.'
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in the Supreme Court's consideration of Acuff-Rose seems to align with the court of appeals determination that 2 Live Crew's song was not a true parody.n In fact, Justice
Kennedy seemed to urge, on remand, that the lower court find that 2 Live
Crew's song was not a parody entitled to fair-use protection, and Justice
Kennedy also urged future courts to be wary of a commercial knock-off in
parody's clothes:
While I am not so assured that 2 Live Crew's song is a legitimate
parody, the Court's treatment of the remaining factors leaves room
for the District Court to determine on remand that the song is not

223. Id.
224. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1435-36 n.8. While the court of appeals considered the district
court's analysis of whether the 2 Live Crew song was a true parody improper, the court of appeals
assumed that the district court' analysis was correct in order to continue its analysis of the four statutory fair-use factors. Id. at 1435-36. The court of appeals noted that the definition of parody, though
clear, is often confused, id. at 1435, but stated that
the term parody cannot be allowed to assume too broad a definition, for if an "infringement
of a copyrightable expression could be justified as a fair use solely on the basis of the
infringer's claim to a higher or different artistic use.., there would be no practicable
boundary to the fair use defense."
Id. at 1436 (quoting Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992)).
225. Id. at 1436 n.1155.
226. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1181 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
227. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1436 n.155.
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a fair use. As future courts apply our fair use analysis, they must
take care to ensure that not just any commercial take-off is rationalized post hoc as a parody." 8
Despite being reasonably intelligent people, judges should neither be
required nor be permitted to engage in the qualitative analysis of artistic
meaning that the Supreme Court's definitional approach to parody requires
when a parodist/satirist claims fair use. Reasonable judges and Justices in
the Acuff-Rose opinions disagreed as to whether 2 Live Crew's rap song
was a true parody that criticized the original song.229 The Supreme Court
majority opinion as well as the district court opinion felt that the rap song
did indeed criticize Orbison's original. 2 ° However, as the court of appeals majority and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinions indicate, it
certainly is reasonable to conclude that 2 Live Crew did not parody the
original, but merely took Orbison's classic rock ballad and repackaged it
into a suitable format for the rap music market.23 It could be argued, for
example, that 2 Live Crew's allegedly parodic addition of "scraper
sounds" to Orbison's classic was not parodic at all since "scraper sounds"
are extraordinarily common in rap music. Moveover, one might surmise
that 2 Live Crew sang off key not in an attempt to parody, but in an attempt to sing despite the notable lack of singing voices. Similarly, 2 Live
Crew's alleged infusion of parody into the original by replacing sweet
lyrics with more shocking ones could be perceived as merely an attempt to
conform to the rap audience's desire for lyrics that are more hard-core
than traditional tales of beautiful, innocent women. As Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion notes:
Almost any revamped modem version of a familiar composition
can be construed as a "comment on the naivete of the original"
because of the difference in style and because it will be amusing
to hear how the old tune sounds in the new genre. Just the thought
Fifth Symphony ...
of a rap version of2Beethoven's
2

is bound to

make people smile.

Judges surely are not equipped to determine what a work of art means,
nor are they equipped to distinguish a parody that comments on the original work from a satire that uses the original work to comment on society,

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1181-82 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See supra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 224-28 and accompanying text.
Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1181 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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or on any thing other than the original work. This is a role for art critics,
and even they are only questionably equipped to make these determinations. What a work of art is, or means, is too subjective a concern to be
part of the fair-use analysisras Yet this is the determination the Court
asks future courts to make when considering whether an allegedly infringing work is a true parody meriting fair-use protectionmra 4
The Supreme Court recognized that whether a parody is in good or
bad taste does not matter in a fair-use analysis.s In warning future
courts not to consider the merit of the parody, the Court quoted Justice
Holmes:
[I]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [a
work], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the
one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the
public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke. 6
Unfortunately, while the Supreme Court prohibited future courts from
considering the worth or value of the art, 7 the Court, by adopting a
definitional approach to parody, has required that courts determine the
meaning of the art when analyzing an alleged parody under the fair-use
doctrine.2" Clearly, such an inquiry is, as Justice Holmes warned, "a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law." 9

233. See infra note 236 and accompanying text. Determining "artistic meaning" is a subjective
arena where judges do not belong. It is impossible for judges to make such determinations precisely
because artistic meaning is inherently subjective. A popular phrase often raised in defense of nontraditional artists or non-traditional artworks is "art is whatever the artist says it is, and means whatever the artist says it means." Judges are equipped to apply the laws to factual determinations, but it is
precisely because "artistic meaning" is not subject to a factual determination that judges should not be
permitted to determine the fate of an alleged parody based on the judge's interpretation of the "artistic

meaning" of the particular work at issue.
234. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171-73.
235. Id. at 1173.
236. Id. (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (alteration

in original)).
237. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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V. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PARODY

The goal of copyright law is to maximize the arts for the public benefit."4 The means used to achieve this goal is an economic incentive given to artists in order to induce them to create works.24' In light of
copyright's purpose, and the means used to achieve that purpose, Congress
directed courts to consider the four statutory factors
in determining wheth2 42
er a particular use of another's material is fair.
However, in considering the statutory fair-use factors in the parody
context, judges have been afforded so much discretion that they have been
able to censor distasteful parodies while seeming to remain within the
established confines of the fair-use doctrine.2 3 Only those parodies that
have satisfied the fair-use requirements in a tasteful and non-sexual manner have consistently been given protection by the courts. While the content-neutral Copyright Act does not authorize courts to critique the moral
value of the parodies, the discretion inherent in the statutory factors, at
least prior to the Supreme Court's Acuff-Rose decision, permitted courts to
mask 4 their censorship behind findings of commerciality and substantial
use.

24

As there have been no fair-use decisions concerning parodies since the
Supreme Court's opinion in Acuff-Rose, it is too early to tell whether the
Court's guidance on how to apply the fair-use factors in the parody context will affect lower courts' treatment of distasteful parodies. Nevertheless, while the Supreme Court expressly admonished future courts to not
consider the artistic value of the parodies,245 the Court's adoption of a
definitional approach to parodies empowers future courts to censor distasteful parodies by determining that the alleged parody is merely a satire.2" The requirement that future courts determine whether the secondary work is a true parody (i.e., the requirement that courts determine the
meaning of the alleged parody)247 is not only unworkable, but also is inconsistent with the goal of copyright law and of the Constitution's Copyright Clause: maximizing, for the benefit of the public, the available pool
of all creative works-not just those works deemed suitable by the courts,
or those works that criticize the originals upon which they are based."

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
See supra notes 138, 160-62 and accompanying text.
Id.
Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1173.
See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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When the purpose of fair use, coterminous with the purpose of copyright law, is considered, there are only three considerations that should be
addressed if courts continue to consider parodies under the fair-use doctrine: First, what should be required of a work in order to be considered a
parody for fair-use analysis? Second, as the copyright law requires, does
the parody contribute to the progress of the useful arts? Third, does the
parody substantially interfere with the economic incentives that spur creativity?
A. Fair-UseAnalysis-Consideration#1-What Should Be
Required of a Work to Be Considered a
Parodyfor Fair-UsePurposes?
The first consideration is whether a parody must criticize or comment
on the original work in order to receive fair-use protection.249 This distinction adopted by the Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose is good in theory because it would prevent artists from capitalizing on the creativity of others
by simply taking a popular work and adapting it. However, this distinction
is completely unworkable because judges are not equipped to determine
the "true meaning" of an alleged parody. Moreover, giving judges this
inherent power to interpret "meaning" is akin to making judges art critics
whenever a parodist or satirist claims fair use.
Because of the unworkability of a distinction requiring judges to interpret the meaning of works of art, and because judges should not have the
inherent power to make value judgments about the true meaning of works
of art, a parody, for fair-use analysis, should not be required to criticize or
comment on the original. In fact, judges should be prohibited from making
such subjective determinations. A parody, for fair-use purposes, should be
defined as "an imitation of a work more or less closely modelled on the
original, but so turned as to produce a ridiculous [or humorous] effect. as' This should be a subjective, good faith test.

249. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
250. 11 OxFORi ENGUSH DICTIONARY 247 (2d ed. 1989). This definition, which does not require
the parody to actually criticize or comment on the original work, also finds support in Webster's Dictionary, which defines parody as "a literary or musical work in which the style of an author or work is
closely imitated for comic effect or... ridicule;" see WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 857 (1988), and in Roget's 21st Century Thesaurus, which includes as synonyms for parody,
"burlesque, caricature, copy, deride, disparage, distort, do a takeoff of, exaggerate, impersonate.... lampoon.... satirize ....
travesty." RoGET's 21sT CENTURY THESAURUS 608 (1992).
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B. Fair-UseAnalysis--Consideration#2--Does the Parody
Contribute to the Progress of the Useful Arts?
The goal of copyright law is to promote broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts, and to increase the available pool of
creative works for the public's intellectual enrichment."' Therefore, with
regard to the second consideration, we should presume that, by taking
portions of the original and creating a new work for society to consider, a
parody does contribute to the progress of the useful arts. 2 It is true that
the same observation could be made of other derivative works, the rights
to which are exclusively within the domain of the copyright owner's monopoly. But a parody, unlike other derivative works, is not likely to be
licensed by the original artist. 3 It is precisely because society benefits
from parodies and because parodies made about, or through, an artist's
original work are unlikely to be licensed, that special protection must be
afforded to parodists.
C. Fair-UseAnalysis--Consideration#3-Does the Parody
Substantially Interfere with the Economic
Incentives that Spur Creativity?
The third principal consideration should be whether the parody substantially interferes with the economic incentives that spur creativity. Only
when the parody "supersede[s] the use of the original," 4 or when the
parody displaces the market for the original 5 will copyright's economic
incentive to create be severely hampered. As Judge Leval stated, "The
market impairment should not turn [this consideration] ...

unless it is

reasonably substantial. When the injury to the copyright holder's potential
market would substantially impair the incentive to create works for publication, the objectives of the copyright law require that this [consideration] weigh heavily against the secondary user."" It is unlikely, however, that creation of a parody will ever substantially impair copyright's
economic incentive system because, as the Second Circuit noted:
[A]ny work of sufficient notoriety to be the object of parody has
already secured for its proprietor considerable financial benefit.
251. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g, Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that parodists will seldom
get permission from those whose works are parodied and, thus, the parody defense to copyright infringement exists precisely to make possible a use that generally cannot be bought).
254. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
255. See Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1177-78.
256. Leval, supra note 202, at 1125.
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According that proprietor further protection against parody does
little to promote creativity, but it places a substantial inhibition
upon the creativity of authors adept at using parody to entertain,
inform, or stir public consciousness."
D. Fair-UseAnalysis-Summary of Proposed Considerations
In sum, if a parody contributes to the progress of the useful arts without severely hampering copyright's economic incentives to create, then the
parody should be deemed a fair use. Under this Note's proposed framework for analyzing parodies under the fair-use doctrine, parodies are presumed to be fair uses as long as: (1) the allegedly infringing work is arguably a take off on an original work and it is intended to be funny or ridiculous; (2) the parody is transformative (i.e., it adds to the original and thus
adds to the stockpile of creative works for the benefit of the public); and
(3) the parody does not replace the original work to such a degree that the
economic incentive for the original artist to create is substantially diminished.
E. Flaws in the ProposedFair-UseAnalysis
and an Alternative Proposal
Congress determined that, as part of copyright protection, artists
should have the exclusive right to prepare, or to authorize the preparation
of, derivative works. 8 A parody clearly is a derivative work within the
scope of the original artist's exclusive rights. Thus, it can be surmised that
Congress intended the economic benefits from such derivative works as
part of the economic incentive to spur artists to create original works. If
this supposition is correct, then there is reason to have concern with this
Note's proposed fair-use analysis for parodies because, under this Note's
analysis, the parodists are entitled to copy from an original work without
paying anything to the original artist.
It is true that, under a traditional fair-use analysis, parodists are entitled to borrow from original works free of charge, but this Note's proposal
strongly tilts fair-use analysis of parodies in favor of the parodists. Moreover, because of the ease with which parodists can successfully claim fair
use under this Note's analysis, the risk articulated by Justice Kennedy in
Acuff-Rose that artists can "exploit existing works and then later claim that
their rendition" is a parody becomes more substantial. 9

257. Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1983).
258. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
259. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1181 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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While this Note has considered parody's place in the fair-use context,2" there is an alternative analysis that can be employed in the consideration of parodies that, while beyond the scope of this Note, is worthy
of mention. As part of the Copyright Act,2 61 Congress established a compulsory licensing system for certain works. 62 Certain artists are entitled
to use vast portions of an original work, and, in return, the original artist
is entitled to receive royalties from the second artist.2 63 Presently, the
compulsory licensing scheme is only available to artists who do not
change "the fundamental character of the work. ' 2 64 As parodists generally change the character of the original work, they would not be entitled
to a compulsory license to use the original artist's work.
However, a compulsory licensing scheme easily could be developed to
accommodate parodies. Such a scheme, while disentitling parodist's to free
use of an original copyrighted work, could eradicate faults inherent within
the fair-use system. First, a compulsory licensing scheme would increase
the pool of available works for the benefit of society by securing for all
parodists the right to make any parody without fear that a court would
find it an infringing work. Second, such a scheme would disempower
judges from making the subjective determinations about artistic meaning
that are currently required under a fair-use analysis. Third, while the
parodists would have an economic incentive to create, the original artist
would also receive economic benefits, thus enhancing the economic incentive for artists to create original works.
VI. CONCLUSION

While the equitable fair-use doctrine may be sufficient in other contexts, the discretion inherent in the doctrine prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Acuff-Rose allowed courts to censor distasteful or sexually
explicit parodies. Moreover, as a result of the Acuff-Rose decision, judges
are now empowered to critique the work in question in order to determine
its true meaning. Judges should not be permitted to censor distasteful
parodies and then hide behind the statutory fair-use factors, nor should
judges be permitted to determine the fate of a parody based on a subjective interpretation of the parody's true meaning. Accordingly, if courts
continue to consider parodies under a fair-use analysis, an alternative
approach is needed. This Note has suggested one such approach. Alterna-

260. See id. at 1172 (stating that "parody ... has to work its way through the [fair use] factors
and be judged case by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law").
261. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
262. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1988).
263. Id.
264. Id.
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tively, Congress should develop a compulsory licensing system for parodies to ensure the continued existence of all parodies, not merely those
parodies deemed suitable by the particular judges presiding over the parody fair-use cases.
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